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Abstract 
This paper considers geographical variations in the demand and supply of bank finance for 
innovative firms in the UK. It uses a detailed survey on the finances of almost 40,000 UK Small 
and Medium Sized Enterprises for 2011 – 2013 to investigate both the extent and type of 
applications for bank finance by innovative firms in peripheral regions, whether funders accept 
their applications and whether acceptance rates reflect objective criteria, such as credit scores, or 
their location. The paper finds evidence of higher demand for bank finance for innovative firms 
in peripheral areas, but that these firms are more likely to be discouraged from applying. 
However, there is strong evidence that innovative firms in peripheral regions are more likely to 
have their applications for finance rejected, even when controlling for factors such as credit 
score. The findings suggest that geography matters in the financing of innovative firms and firms 
in peripheral areas may suffer a “liability of distance” which potentially reinforces regional 
disparities. The implications of these findings for public policy are outlined. 
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1. Introduction 
There is increasing interest in the relationship between innovation, the financial system and 
economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; Mazzucato, 2013). A number of studies have 
considered whether the financial system properly supports innovative firms (Freel, 2007; Mina, 
Lahr, & Hughes, 2013; Lee, Sameen, & Cowling, 2015). Information asymmetries, the cost and 
difficulty of valuing intellectual property (IP), or the erratic returns to innovation may all 
discourage potential investors and make innovative firms reliant on a smaller number of financial 
providers. Economic geographers meanwhile have suggested that the availability of finance is 
embedded in wider processes of uneven development (Hall, 2013). While the financial system in 
the UK is increasingly geographically concentrated in London and a few secondary cities 
(Marshall et al., 2012; Wójcik & MacDonald Korth, 2015), firms in peripheral regions face a 
challenge in accessing finance, as they may be distant from the key institutions which offer it. Yet 
relatively little research has considered the relationship between these two issues: does geography 
matter for the financing of innovative firms? 
There is good evidence on the uneven geography of equity finance, such as venture capital (VC) 
or stock markets (Martin et al, 2002; Martin et al, 2005; Clark, 2005; Mason and Pierrakis, 2013; 
Wójcik, 2011). However, less research has considered how debt finance varies geographically, 
although the empirical literature suggests that this too has its own particular geography 
(Alessandrini et al, 2009a; 2009b; 2009c). While traditionally small business finance was thought 
to be a local “close-knit affair” (DeYoung et al, 2008, 114), over the past few decades the 
distances between small business and bank lenders has increased markedly (Petersen and Rajan, 
2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2005). During this time, banking has undergone significant changes. 
Amongst the most significant have been changes in the set of “lending technologies” used by 
banks to evaluate lending decisions.3 As Udell (2015) sets out, there are a variety of potential 
ways in which banks can evaluate borrowers, each of which has its own information 
requirements. Traditional relationship lending, based on long-term engagement between bank 
and applicants, has been declining relative to new lending technologies reliant on automated 
decision making (Berger and Udell, 2006). Relationship lending was more likely to be based on 
“soft” information and the bank’s understanding of the applicant’s business model whereas 
newer lending technologies tend to be based on “hard” information such as balance sheet 
information or credit scores (Udell, 2015). 
The economic geography of the UK’s banking system has also been changing, as a response to 
new technology, institutional change and the global financial crisis (GFC). Work on the changing 
                                                             
3 A lending technology is defined by Berger and Udell (2006, p. 2948) as the “unique combination of the 
primary source of information, screening and underwriting policies/procedures, structure of loan 
contracts, and monitoring strategies”. 
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nature of banking systems has highlighted two key changes which may have spatial implications 
for lending behaviour in banks (Berger and Udell, 2002; Alessandrini et al., 2009b). First, the 
“operational distance”, the proximity between bank branches and borrowers, has increased. 
Secondly, the “functional distance” between a bank’s branches and a bank’s headquarters has 
also increased. The more hierarchically organized and distant (both physically and culturally) 
banks are from local economies, the more problematic are channels of communication (Berger 
and Udell, 2002; Stein, 2000; Scott, 2004). While these processes have been extensively analysed 
in the Italian context (Alessandrini et al., 2009b), little work has examined these changes in the 
UK.  
However, the interaction of these two factors – the increased reliance on ‘hard information’ in 
bank lending decisions and the changing geographical structure of the banking industry – present 
a challenge for innovative firms in UK peripheral regions. Asymmetric information between firm 
and financier has long been seen as a problem for innovative firms seeking finance (Mina et al. 
2013). Innovative firms in peripheral regions may face a number of additional challenges. First, as 
bank-lending decisions become less based on local discretion and more on hard sources of 
information (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010), innovative companies in peripheral regions may be 
distant from decision makers, and so simply perceive themselves as less likely to access finance 
than those elsewhere. Second, as they are less able to access the relatively geographically clustered 
markets for equity finance, firms in peripheral regions may actually be more reliant on bank 
lending than firms elsewhere. And finally, the combination of increased demand due to lack of 
alternatives and lower supply may mean that applications for finance from peripheral innovators 
may be more likely to be rejected. 
These firm level phenomena underpin theory in economic geography which considers 
interactions between finance flows and peripherality. As Hall (2013, 286) argues: “Financial 
circuits and flows are grounded in, produced by and thoroughly entangled with wider economic 
geographies beyond the inter-national financial system.” The literature on financialization 
suggests that the supply of capital will have increasing impact on the actions of firms (Dore, 
2008). As capital markets are disembedded from local economies, flows may begin to both reflect 
and reinforce growing unevenness between places (French et al, 2009; Pike & Pollard, 2010). 
Capital flows may become ‘sticky’ (Clark, 2005) with finance clustering in certain core regions, 
rather than spreading to where returns are the greatest. Geographical distance will also reflect 
other forms of proximity, such as cognitive, organisational or institutional, which may all serve to 
create geographical unevenness in financial markets (Wójcik, 2011). This leads to a significant 
concern: innovative firms in peripheral regions may find it harder to access finance, and this may 
then potentially reinforce disparities.  
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To date little research has considered the availability of bank finance for innovative firms in 
peripheral UK regions. This is an important omission as research typically finds innovative firms 
to have more restricted access to credit than typical SMEs in the UK (Freel, 2007; Lee et al, 
2015). This paper addresses this gap with an analysis of the demand and supply of finance for 
innovative SMEs in peripheral areas of the UK. Given its banking system is notoriously “thin 
and centralized” (Degryse et al, 2015, 28), the UK provides an excellent context for this research 
(see also Martin et al, 2005; Gardiner et al, 2013), particularly given evidence that the spatial 
concentration has been increasing since the financial crisis of 2007/8 (Wójcik & MacDonald 
Korth, 2015). We use a large, high quality dataset on the finances of almost 40,000 SMEs which 
contains excellent firm level information, including credit scores and postcode areas in which the 
firm is based. We then use a series of regression models, controlling for selection effects where 
appropriate, to address the following research questions:  
(1) Are there differences in the demand for finance, measured either through (i) applications 
or (ii) discouragement, for innovative firms in peripheral regions? 
(2) Are there differences in the supply of finance for innovative firms in peripheral and non-
peripheral regions? 
This study makes a number of contributions to the literature on the geography of banking and 
finance. Despite multiple claims to its importance (e.g. Pollard 2003; Pike & Pollard, 2010), the 
relationship between firm financing and patterns of uneven development has been “largely 
overlooked” (Hall, 2013, 286). To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to investigate the 
geography of both demand and supply of bank finance for innovative firms in a single paper. 
The paper is also among the first to consider the financing of innovative firms in the regional 
context (Coronado, Acosta, & Fernández, 2008; Alessandrini et al, 2009b), and the first to do so 
in the UK.  
The research reported also has important implications for government policy. Following the 
recent establishment of the British Business Bank some policy makers have proposed a network 
of regional banks as a potential solution to the presumed lack of finance in peripheral regions 
(van der Schans, 2015). The Scottish Government are already in the process of establishing a 
Scottish Business Development Bank to support innovative SMEs with high growth potential 
(Scottish Government, 2015). Yet the evidence base for such interventions is weak and past 
efforts to increase the supply of specialised finance in peripheral regions have typically resulted in 
limited success (Mason and Harrison, 2003; Martin et al., 2005; Nightingale et al., 2009; Lerner, 
2010; Grilli and Murtini, 2014).  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews the literature and develops a set of 
hypotheses to test. Section three describes the dataset and presents the empirical model. Section 
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four considers both demand for finance and rejection rates, a measure of supply. Section five 
tests whether our results apply to lagging regions. Section six concludes with a discussion of the 
implications for theory and policy. 
 
2. Finance, geography and innovative firms 
 
Financing innovative firms 
Since Schumpeter highlighted the role of finance in innovation (Schumpeter, 1939), researchers 
have considered the importance of the supply and demand of finance in enabling innovative 
firms to grow (e.g. Freel, 2007; Mazzucato, 2013; Mina et al., 2013). Research suggests a number 
of reasons why innovative firms may find it harder to access finance than less innovative firms. 
Innovation is “essentially a speculative process” (Freel, 2007, p. 23) which involves “a bet on the 
future, and most attempts fail” (Mazzucato, 2013, p. 851). While some firms achieve large returns 
from innovation, many others fail to benefit (Coad & Rao, 2008). As a result, financiers may be 
reluctant to invest, particularly those who are dependent on debt repayment rather than equity 
stakes. In addition, innovations can often involve expenditure on unrecoverable sunk costs, 
reducing the collateral required by some lenders (O’Brien and Folta, 2009). Finally, there may be 
information asymmetries between providers of finance, especially small innovative 
informationally opaque SMEs (Colombo and Grilli, 2007). Finance providers reliant on ‘hard’ 
information such as credit scores and balance sheet data may be unwilling to accept ‘soft’ 
information such as a new business plan. The result may be that innovative small firms cannot 
obtain the external finance they need. Yet the counter argument is that innovative firms will offer 
greater returns, be more attractive to specialist VC funders and so find it easier to find finance. 
Unsurprisingly, given these contrasting arguments, the evidence on whether a finance gap exists 
specifically for innovative firms is quite mixed. Freel (2007) finds small innovative firms who 
apply for finance are less likely to receive it than others. Lee et al. (2015) similarly find that 
innovative SMEs in the UK are more likely to be turned down for finance but, while their 
chances of rejection worsened in the recession, it improved relative to other firms. In contrast, in 
a nuanced, comparative study of larger firms Mina et al. (2013) found that innovative firms find it 
no harder to access finance in the UK than other firms, but actually easier in the US. Their 
results differ according to the measure of innovation used. Hain and Christensen (2013) find that 
incremental innovators are able to access the finance they need, yet firms which introduce radical 
innovations or technology-based innovations are often credit rationed. Others have suggested 
that process innovation, which often requires substantial levels of capital investment, will also 
require recourse to external finance (Hall and Khan, 2003). 
Demand and supply of finance in peripheral regions 
 7 
Despite a vast literature on access to finance for small firms, until quite recently relatively little 
research has considered how it varies spatially. Economists have tended to assume no friction of 
distance between places and so no spatial variation in access to finance (Dow & Rodríguez-
Fuentes, 1997). Indeed, when contextualising firm finance all too often the literature treats firms 
as “placeless entities” (Pollard, 2003, pp. 440) despite the fact that “financial systems are 
inherently spatial” (Mason, 2010, pp. 167). Economic geographers on the other hand have 
highlighted the potential problem of the UK’s highly spatially concentrated markets for small 
firm equity, and suggested that this may lead to a problem for firms seeking external finance 
(Klagge and Martin 2005). A number of commentators have suggested that firms outside 
London and the South East of England may find it harder to obtain finance and that this 
problem, in turn, exacerbates regional disparities (Cox and Schmueker 2013).  
There are essentially two positions on the existence of regional finance gaps. The first is that 
location does not matter and technology has rendered location unimportant (Petersen and Rajan, 
2002). Lending technologies such as computerised credit scoring and other automated systems 
may make face-to-face contact a less significant part of the financing decision (Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Berger and Udell, 2006). Banks will see geography as unimportant and 
focus only on apparently objective balance sheet activity. ‘Mundane’ finance from banks is, if this 
view is correct, unlikely to vary spatially. 
A second view is that geography fundamentally shapes the financing of innovative firms. The 
literature on financialization provides strong evidence that finance capital does not flow 
automatically to the most profitable firm, but rather reflects other factors. In explaining this 
tendency, Clark (2005, pp. 106) amongst others has used the metaphor of Mercury to describe 
money, arguing that it “runs together” - accumulating in pools rather than being evenly spread. 
Wójcik (2011) shows that firms near financial centres are more likely to offer equity on stock 
markets than those elsewhere. One reason for this might be the tendency for institutions 
providing finance to focus on specific geographical areas. Such patterns became clear in the 2008 
financial crisis where, faced with a complex and opaque financial system (Christophers, 2009), a 
‘herd instinct’ led banks to follow similar strategies to each other, seeking short-term profit 
(Marshall et al. 2012). The result is that the capital market is not efficient, with finance flowing 
readily to some areas (classically, Silicon Valley) even as similar firms are unable to fund 
themselves in more disadvantaged regions. In contrast to a view of financial markets as being 
efficient allocators of capital, this position suggests that the lending decisions of banks are 
embedded in wider geographical structures which shape which firms receive the capital they seek. 
Rather than being objective, the lending technologies used by banks are part of a complex system 
aimed at accumulation - and these processes will have their own geographical implications 
(Christophers, 2014; Ashton and Christophers, 2015).  
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Indeed, it might be that changes in lending technologies have made it harder for firms in 
peripheral areas to access finance as banks have moved from relationship banking, based on 
long-term engagement and localized discretion, to automated and computerized lending 
decisions based on “hard information” on the actual financial performance of the firm (Udell, 
2015). Research in the US has found that distance erodes a lender’s ability to collect soft 
proprietary intelligence (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010). For innovative firms in peripheral 
regions, such changes may create problems. Rather than discussing new product development 
with a local decision-maker who then decides the potential for repayment, innovative firms may 
face the challenge of obtaining finance based primarily on the calculation made by the bank of 
their ability to repay, rather than the potential of their innovation to achieve growth. These issues 
may be compounded by a lack of autonomy amongst local bank branches, along with the 
characteristics of staff in peripheral areas. In his study of bank lending in rural New Zealand, 
Perry (1988) argued that staff in these areas were exposed to fewer types of lending decisions 
and, partly as a consequence, were less able to deal with non-standard applications and given less 
autonomy to do so. While they may have access to banks, distance from the core areas may make 
it harder for applicants to access the right sort of banking provision. 
A further explanation comes from the literature on the ‘spatial fix’ of finance (Sokol, 2013). In 
this case, finance flows to the most profitable location, regardless of the consequences for other 
regions. In this case, finance may flow to those regions where it is already available and abundant, 
as credit scores will be better, collateral may be more apparent or firm balance sheets will be 
healthier. This may be a rational act, but it will have consequences for regional development as 
banks focus on: “financial returns above producing sustainable economies in peripheral regions” 
(Hall, 2013, 288). The UK context may make this process particularly acute. The 1990s saw 
period of de-mutualisation of previously locally embedded building societies in the UK (Marshall 
et al. 2012). Finance then becomes an integral part of the processes reinforcing uneven economic 
geographies (Pollard, 2003; Pike & Pollard, 2010). 
These theoretical channels may have a two-way relationship with local cultural and institutions.4 
For example, the nature of entrepreneurial culture is seen as important for explaining variations 
in start-up rates (Huggins and Thompson, 2014a) and networks are important in the sharing of 
knowledge about business success (Witt, 2003; Huggins and Thompson, 2014b), the so-called 
“network success hypothesis” (Brüderl & Preisendörfer, 1998). These effects may both 
discourage and reduce the success of applications from entrepreneurs in peripheral regions where 
these factors are more anaemic. Thus, innovative firms in peripheral regions may be less likely to 
be aware of specialised financiers or financial alternatives (Seghers, Manigart, & Vanacker, 2012) 
as they have fewer peers who have accessed finance (Wójcik, 2011). They may also have less 
                                                             
4 We are grateful to a referee for this point. 
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contact with financiers based in core regions. Conversely, local cultures of debt or equity finance 
may develop among groups of entrepreneurs in more dynamic areas (Wójcik, 2011,). This 
corresponds with the ‘embeddedness’ view of finance where these kind of social relations and 
networks heavily shape “who gets credit and what that credit costs” (Uzzi, 1990, 502). 
These theoretical perspectives seem to be supported by empirical evidence. Alessandrini et al. 
2009c, for example, find clear evidence of a spatial relationship between credit availability and 
peripheral regions. Their analysis conducted during the period 1996-2003, found that greater 
functional distance has accentuated financing constraints in firms. These adverse effects are 
particularly evident for small firms located in the southern Italian provinces (Alessandrini et al. 
2009c). A further study examining credit availability in Italy found a similar picture during a 
different time period, 2001-2008, and noted a strong reliance on internal funds for peripheral 
SMEs (Donati and Sarno, 2015). Similarly, research in Belgium found that loan rates “decrease 
with the distance between the firm and the lender” as a consequence of greater transportation 
costs (Degryse and Ongena, 2005, 262). Research in the US also shows that both distance and 
credit scoring are associated with higher default probabilities (DeYoung et al, 2008). Some 
studies do report results to the contrary: for example, Carling and Lundberg (2005) analysed 
lending by Swedish banks and found no evidence of geographical credit rationing. Overall the 
findings from empirical studies show a fairly consistent picture of geographical variation in either 
the demand or supply of finance, suggesting a bias against firms in remote areas.  
There are limitations within this existing literature however. First the majority of the evidence is 
based on data from the Italian banking sector (Alessandrini et al. 2009c; Donati and Sarno, 2015). 
At present empirical evidence from other centralised banking systems is lacking. It makes it hard 
to know whether these “distance effects” are applicable in countries like the UK. Second, most 
work treats SMEs as a singular classification rather than differentiating between those who are 
innovative and non-innovators. Yet, going back to Schumpeter’s core thesis (1939) a 
considerable body of work has shown that innovative growth-oriented SMEs are much more 
likely to contribute to regional development than less dynamic ones (Coad and Rao, 2008; Mason 
and Brown, 2013). This is important because existing research suggests a lack of credit 
significantly hinders both product and process innovation in Italian SMEs in peripheral regions 
(Alessandrini et al. 2009b). Third, most of these studies use data from before the GFC. During 
times when there are sharp reversals of capital flows, some scholars have speculated that there 
may be a “flight to quality” whereby banks contract credit to smaller and/or riskier firms (Popov 
and Udell, 2012; Cowling et al, 2012). However, recent evidence examining Italian manufacturing 
firms by Presbitero et al (2014) discovered that rather than a flight to quality there appears to be a 
“home bias” on the part of distantly headquartered banks. Financially healthier firms were 
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affected more in functionally distant credit markets, corroborating earlier pre-GFC work 
(Alessandrini et al, 2009b; Donati and Sarno, 2014).  
A final limitation of the literature on small business funding is a lack of theoretical development 
around the issue of debt finance and geography. Scholars have conceptualised similar spatial 
processes for equity finance using the concept of “thin markets” (Nightingale et al, 2009). Thin 
markets arise when “limited numbers of investors and entrepreneurial growth firms within the 
economy have difficulty finding and contracting with each other at reasonable costs” 
(Nightingale et al, 2009, 5). The authors highlight this problem with regard to public VC 
investments in peripheral regions of the UK. In these environments “thin-markets” make it 
expensive for specialist investors and entrepreneurs to find each other outside of the core regions 
of the UK. The process can be cumulative: search costs are higher outside core areas, and so 
financiers are discouraged from looking; those providers of finance in peripheral areas which 
remain are less likely to specialise in financing innovative firms; they tend to focus on less 
resource-intensive early stage finance; and do not develop the appropriate specialisms to fund 
them. Clearly, these arguments apply primarily to equity, rather than bank, finance. But if it is 
hard to obtain equity finance in peripheral areas, or if awareness of these finance types is lower, 
firms may be forced to choose less suitable finance – i.e. innovative peripheral firms may make 
applications to banks as they lack access to equity finance.  
Hypothesis Development  
Taken together, the limitations within the literature point to the need for more empirical work 
and theoretical development around the issue of credit availability within innovative SMEs since 
the GFC. Building on the omissions identified, three testable hypotheses can be developed. The 
first is that innovative firms in peripheral regions may be discouraged from applying for finance. 
In their classic paper on discouragement, Kon & Storey (2003) develop a model where there are 
good and bad firms and there is a cost (financial, time or “psychic”) which dissuades firms from 
seeking external sources of funding. In the context of asymmetric information and the 
knowledge that they lack the track record or collateral to successfully apply, some firms will be 
discouraged from borrowing. However, Freel et al. (2012) use a large sample of over 9,000 firms 
but find no statistically significant evidence that innovative firms are more likely to be 
discouraged. However, if the ability to obtain financing is embedded in local cultures or 
networks, and entrepreneurs believe that financing is harder to obtain in their location, it might 
be that cultures of discouragement develop. From this, the first hypothesis is: 
H1 Innovative firms in peripheral regions are more likely to be discouraged from applying 
for bank finance than non-innovative firms or innovative firms elsewhere 
 11 
Second, supply side issues may simultaneously make bank finance even more important for 
innovative firms in peripheral regions than those elsewhere (Klagge and Martin 2005). The classic 
explanation of the firm financing decision is the ‘pecking-order’ theory of finance (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). To avoid losing control of a business, this theory suggests firms will choose first to 
use internal finance, then debt finance and will only reluctantly use equity finance as a last resort 
(Frank and Goyal, 2003). While this principle seems to hold for larger firms it does not always 
apply to smaller firms. Due to information asymmetries, small firms “do not seem to follow a 
pecking order” of preferences (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010, 55), as investors perceive them to 
be ‘riskier bets’.  This will be particularly true for small firms who have untested technologies or 
IP as their core source of competitive advantage. In these particular cases, the pecking order may 
be reversed with firms’ first seeking equity funding and then seeking other forms of funding. In 
the absence of VC funding firms may turn to general lenders such as banks. Therefore, 
innovative firms in peripheral regions faced with ‘thin markets’ for equity funding may thus be 
pushed towards bank finance even if other forms of finance are more suitable. This is the second 
hypothesis: 
H2 Innovative firms in peripheral regions are more likely to apply for bank finance than 
non-innovative firms or innovative firms elsewhere 
The third potential effect is that it may be harder for innovative firms in peripheral regions to 
access bank finance – a case of regional finance gaps. As set out above, the literature on 
economic geography of finance suggests a number of reasons why this might be the case. The 
value of specialist IP and/or business models may not be immediately obvious to these providers 
of finance, a problem exacerbated by a lack of deal flow from innovative firms. It might also be 
the result of banks having a focus on repayment of loans, rather than firm growth, and so being 
less willing to lend to companies introducing new innovations. These factors will be 
compounded by a scarcity of specialist financiers and banking organisations which lack the 
knowledge of how to value innovations (Nightingale et al., 2009). The potential result is that 
firms in peripheral regions are unable to access equity markets (Wójcik, 2011), and so make less 
suitable applications for bank finance instead. Cultural factors or a lack of local networks might 
also reduce the quality of applications. Meanwhile, regions with higher house prices and so 
collateral may make loans more attractive to banks. So innovative firms in peripheral regions may 
find it harder to persuade distant banks that loans and overdrafts are repayable, increasing 
rejection rates. Evidence from Italy suggests that due to bank consolidation the geographical 
concentration of decision making within banks has increased the functional distance of the 
banking system from local communities, making access to credit for “informationally opaque 
firms in peripheral regions still harder” (Alessandrini et al, 2009b, 303). Building on this, a third 
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hypothesis suggests that innovative firms in peripheral regions may face particular credit 
constraints: 
H3 Innovative firms in peripheral regions face higher rejection rates for bank finance than  
non-innovative firms or innovative firms elsewhere  
3. Data and methodology 
Data 
To investigate geographical variations in financing patterns for innovative firms this paper uses 
the UK Small and Medium Sized Enterprise Finance monitor survey (UKSMEF) from Q1 2011 
– Q3 2013 (BDRC Continental, 2014). This is a large cross sectional survey which gives 
comprehensive information on firms, their balance sheets and financial history, applications for 
finance, and the success of these applications and costs of financing. It is conducted by BDRC 
Continental and the data is made available through the UK Data Archive. The survey had a quota 
for size (with firms having between 1 – 249 employees), sector and region. Enterprises needed to 
have a turnover of less than £25million, be a for-profit enterprise and not be more than 50% 
foreign-owned. To focus on established firms we exclude firms with zero employees. The 
turnover of £25 million is slightly smaller than the EU’s definition of SME (Verheugen, 2005), 
but weights are used to make the results representative of the business stock of this size.  
The key strength of the data is that it has information on both demand for bank finance and 
whether firms successfully obtain it, so developing on other studies which investigate only 
aggregate lending (e.g. Henry et al, 2014). It also has a strong set of control variables, including 
firm characteristics, location and finances. A significant strength is that the data includes credit 
ratings: as is standard, firms are sampled via a database of companies kept by credit rating agency 
and the credit score is kept along with the firm ID. This means that the credit scores used in the 
data are the same as those used by banks to evaluate loans. Policymakers, including the Bank of 
England, now use the data to test UK credit conditions (e.g. Bank of England, 2015). 
Model and estimation strategy 
Demand for bank finance 
Following Mina et al. (2013) we investigate both the demand and supply of finance for 
innovative firms using a probit model and, where appropriate, a Heckman correction for 
selection effects. Our approach begins with an investigation into the demand for bank finance 
(for similar applications see Fraser 2009; Lee & Drever 2014). The basic model here is one where 
DFIN is a measure of whether a firm applies for finance in a given period: 
DFINi = α + β1 FIRMi + β2 FINANCEi + β3 GEOGRAPHYi + β4 WAVEi + φ + ε (1) 
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Where FIRM is a set of variables for the characteristics of the firm, such as size, sector and age. 
FINANCE controls for the credit score and balance sheet of the firms and whether they have 
had issues paying previous debt. GEOGRAPHY is one of two variables for the location of the 
firm. WAVE is a control for the survey wave in which the firm was sampled. “φ” is a sectoral 
dummy variable. The constant is “α” and “ε” is the error term. 
The UKSMEF has data on two sources of bank finance: loans and overdraft. It also gives 
information on discouragement, and whether firms do not apply because they believe 
applications will not be successful (Han et al., 2009; Kon & Storey, 2003). In this case, we follow 
the official statistics and define those who are discouraged as those who do not apply for finance 
because they do not trust banks or think they will be turned down (BDRC, 2014). These three 
variables – applications for loans, overdrafts and discouragement – are the key measures of 
demand for bank finance. 
Supply of finance 
While equation 1 gives an indicator of the demand for bank finance, the second question is the 
extent to which supply differs across geographical locations. This is given as equation 2. 
SFINi = α + β1 FIRMi + β2 FINANCEi + β3 GEOGRAPHYi + β4 WAVEi + φ + ε (2) 
Controls are as before. The basic indicator of supply of finance is whether firms are successul in 
the applications for either bank loans or overdrafts. However, the likelihood of a firm being 
rejected for finance is conditional on their probability of applying for it. Because of this, we also 
estimate this model using the common Heckman selection approach (for applications see Fraser, 
2009; Mina et al., 2013; Lee & Drever, 2014). 
Variables and definitions 
Defining innovative firms 
Studies suggest that the success of firms in accessing finance depends on the type of innovation 
(Hain and Christensen, 2013). Our definition of innovation is whether firms have introduced a 
new product or service in the past 3 years. This is similar to the measure used by Lee et al (2015) 
in their study of access to bank finance in the recession and one incorporated in the study of 
Mina et al. (2013). This is also broadly consistent with the definition of product innovation used 
within the Community Innovation Survey (Hashi, & Stojcic, 2013).5  
Defining ‘peripheral regions’ 
                                                             
5 Innovations are new to the firm, rather than new to the market. Note that we also experiment with an 
alternative, broader measure of innovation: “Whether firms have significantly improved an aspect of the 
business” with similar results. 
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No single definition of “peripheral” exists.  Our measure of peripheral regions is developed from 
the European Spatial Planning and Observation Network (ESPON) Multimodal accessibility 
statistics (ESPON, 2009).  We use the multimodal accessibility index, calculated using the total 
population of other European regions, but weighted according to travel time using road, rail and 
air. This means that rather than being a simple measure of proximity to London, the indicator 
presents a more detailed picture of accessibility. Areas near London tend to score highly, but so 
do places such as Manchester and Birmingham which combine air accessibility with good rail and 
road links. The statistic is indexed relative to the EU average with 100 being the average level of 
accessibility. These are defined as NUTS regions, whereas the UK SME Finance Monitor 
contains data at a postcode area level. To address this, we calculate a weighted average 
accessibility index for each postcode area, based on share of postcode units (a good proxy for 
population size) across each area. We then define ‘peripheral regions’ as those in bottom ten 
percent in the UK. This methodology gives us a sub-set of areas mainly in the South West of 
England, Northern Scotland the Islands and North Wales (see Figure 1 below).6 Note that one 
limitation of this is that it is based on 2006 data, although it is highly unlikely that changes since 
will significantly affect the results. This is the most robust indicator possible and has the 
significant advantage of being multimodal rather than being based on a single mode of transport. 
We also consider an alternative measure of peripherality in the robustness tests with little change 
to the main results.  
Insert figure 1 around here 
Control variables 
A series of controls are used to account for other factors which may influence both demand and 
supply of bank finance. Summary statistics and variable definitions are given in table 1. 
Insert table 1 around here 
First we consider firm size and age. Size can be measured in a number of ways, but in an effort to 
avoid endogeneity with loan size, total employment is used here. This is given in six employment 
size categories: 1 – 9; 10-49; 50 – 99; 100 – 199 and; 200 – 249. Age is also considered. An 
unweighted 10 percent of the sample are ‘start-ups’ defined here as being two years old or 
younger. The other categories are 2 – 5 years old, 6 – 9 years, 10 – 15 years with the largest 
                                                             
6 The postcode areas included are: Carlisle (CA), Dumfries and Galloway (DG), Dorchester (DT), Exeter, 
the Outer Hebrides (HS), Inverness (IV), Kilmarnock (KA), Orkney (KW), Northern Lancashire (LA), 
Llandudno (LL), Perth (PH), Plymouth (PL), Taunton (TA), Galashiels (TD), Torquay (TQ), Truro (TR) 
and Shetland (ZE). 
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category being older than 15 years. Categories are used in this case for two reasons: to identify 
potential non-linearities and to avoid collinearity with other variables. 
Legal structure may determine the extent to which banks are willing to lend. We control for four 
types of structure: sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability partnership and limited 
liability company. Note that “not for profits” are not included in the survey. 
Finally, we include a variable for the growth ambition of the firm. This takes the value one if 
respondents say they want to grow substantially or moderately when asked about their ambitions 
for the firm. Firms which aim to grow will be more likely to be applying for bank finance for 
investment, rather than working capital. They may also be more likely to be innovative. 
Four variables are included for the finance of the firm. The first two are dummy variables for 
whether the firm has made a profit or a loss in their most recent trading period (the reference 
category is whether firms have broken even). A control is also used for past financial problems 
(Armstrong et al. 2013). This takes the value 1 if a firm has missed a loan repayment, an 
unauthorised overdraft, bounced cheques or used the government’s “Time to Pay Scheme” 
which is for insolvent firms.  
Some argue gender may influence access to bank finance, potentially through discrimination but 
more likely because gender influences the type of advice sought by management (Scott & Irwin, 
2009). We control for this with a dummy variable for whether firms are woma`n owned. 
In addition, a set of controls are used for the risk rating of the firm. One problem is that credit 
score is likely to be endogenous with the decision to apply for bank finance. As is now standard 
in the literature using these surveys, following authors such as Han et al. (2009), an instrumented 
credit score is used to address this problem. The credit score of each firm is predicted using an 
ordinal logit model and the base characteristics of the firm. 
Two additional variables control for the firms activities. The first of these is whether a firm 
exports. The second is whether a firm has a business plan. Firms with business plans will be 
more able to access bank finance as this can be a requirement of some providers. It will also 
signal a better-managed firm (Smith, 1998). Sector will also be important and seven dummy 
variables are used to control for this. 
As the period in question is one in which lending to small firms fluctuated significantly, dummy 
variables are also included for the quarter of the survey in which the firm was sampled (e.g. Q1 
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2013; Q2 2014 etc).7 These dummy variables will account for aggregate changes in the supply of 
finance. 
 
4. Results: Demand and supply of bank finance in peripheral regions  
Demand for bank finance 
The first research question is whether innovative firms in peripheral regions have a lower 
demand for bank finance than firms elsewhere. Table 2 gives simple cross tabulations related to 
the financing variables according to whether firms are innovators and their location. Significance 
tests are given in parentheses (to accommodate weights, these are the result of a probit regression 
with column 4 as the reference category).  
Insert table 2 around here 
Relative to normal firms (non-innovative firms in the periphery), innovative firms are more likely 
to apply for bank finance. The difference is relatively small, but statistically significant and it 
applies for both loans and overdrafts. “Normal” firms in peripheral regions are also particularly 
likely to apply for both loans, although not overdrafts. Innovative firms in core regions are also 
more likely to apply for both loans and overdrafts. 
The basic regression results for these three measures of demand for bank finance - loan 
applications, overdraft applications and discouraged borrowers - are given in table 3. Models are 
estimated as probit regressions with weights. For each of the three dependent variables, models 
are first given with simple variables for peripheral firms and innovators but no controls, then 
with interactions between the periphery/innovation variables but no controls, and then for both 
basic variables and interactions but with full controls.8  
Insert table 3 around here 
The first hypothesis is the extent to which these firms are discouraged from borrowing. There is 
no evidence that peripherality matters here, although innovators are certainly more likely to be 
discouraged than other firms. When considering interaction effects (columns 3 and 4), the results 
suggest non-peripheral innovators are more likely to be discouraged from borrowing than firms 
elsewhere, even when controlling for other characteristics such as their risk profiles. The effect is, 
if anything, even more pronounced for innovative firms in peripheral regions (the coefficient is 
more than double). We find both that innovative firms are particularly likely to be discouraged 
                                                             
7 Note that the first two waves (Q1 2011 and Q2 2011) are amalgamated in the data file. This small issue is 
unlikely to significantly affect the results. 
8 As is standard, models are run with robust standard errors. There is some evidence of collinearity – as 
might be expected - between the instrumented credit scores and other controls. Yet removing the collinear 
variables makes no difference to the main results. 
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from borrowing but also that the effect is even larger in peripheral regions. There is no grounds 
to reject our first hypothesis, that innovative firms in peripheral regions are more likely to be 
discouraged from seeking bank finance.  
Considering next loan applications (columns 5 – 8), peripheral firms make more applications 
than do innovative firms. These results hold when interactions are included and are robust to 
controls. Innovative firms outside of peripheral regions are more likely to apply for loans even 
when controlling for their other characteristics. This ‘demand’ effect seems, if anything, to be 
greater for innovative firms in peripheral regions where the coefficient is slightly larger. Similarly, 
‘normal’ firms in peripheral regions have higher loan application rates. Considering overdraft 
applications (columns 9 – 12) provides more nuance to this story. As with loans, innovative firms 
are more likely to apply for overdrafts than other firms – but in this case, there is no effect from 
being in a peripheral region. As with loans, the effect is larger for peripheral innovators than 
those in non-peripheral areas. 
In short, the results show higher demand for external finance for both innovative and peripheral 
firms – and innovative firms in the periphery are more likely to apply for both overdrafts and 
loans than normal firms. Given that we also find evidence of discouragement, this provides no 
grounds to reject our hypotheses related to increased demand for bank finance amongst 
peripheral innovators. It might be that, given that other types of entrepreneurial finance display 
distinct geographical bias, innovators in peripheral regions have fewer options for external 
financing than those elsewhere and so feel unable to access the specialist finance they need. But 
this lack of options – along with an absence of internal or other resources - means innovative 
firms in peripheral regions are also more reliant on bank funding than other firms. 
 
Rejection rates and the supply of bank finance 
Next we consider the extent to which firms who apply for loans or overdrafts are able to 
successfully obtain them. We estimate these models using two types of regression. In the basic 
regressions (columns 1 – 4) these are simple probit regressions where the dependent variable is 
whether a firm is rejected for a loan or overdraft. Yet these regressions will suffer from selection 
bias: as certain types of firm are more likely to apply for bank finance, we need to control for this 
when estimating regression equations. To address this, we use the common two-step Heckman 
selection equation (see Fraser, 2009; Armstrong, Davis, Liadze, & Rienzo, 2013; Lee & Drever, 
2014). The exclusion criteria for these models are legal status and age (for loan rejections) or 
whether firms have a business plan (for overdraft rejections). We do not report the first stage 
equation as these will be very similar to those given in table 3. 
Insert table 4 around here 
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The basic results are given in columns 1 – 4. These show that being located in a peripheral region 
seems to have no impact on loan or overdraft rejection – in this respect, the dominant narrative 
that geography is unimportant seems correct. Innovation, in contrast, does seem to matter both 
without considering geography and – for loans – when considering interactions with 
peripherality. There is no effect when considering overdrafts. 
The results when controlling for selection are more definitive: while we continue to find no 
effect on non-innovative peripheral firms, we find that innovative firms in peripheral regions find 
it harder to access both loans and overdrafts. In short, there seems to be a penalty for firms 
located in peripheral regions, but this only applies to innovative firms. We find no reason to 
reject our third hypothesis, that innovative firms in peripheral regions will have higher rejection 
rates. One potential factor is lower property values in peripheral areas making it harder for these 
firms to use collateral. As Perry (1988) sets out, lending decisions are made on the ability to 
repay, the equity of the ownership, and the collateral included. Yet rural or peripheral firms may 
find it harder to issue collateral, with the assets of peripheral businesses harder to borrow against 
than more liquid assets such as urban property with high land values (Perry, 1988). 
The control variables also yield some insights. Firms making losses are particularly likely to find it 
hard to access loan finance, but not overdrafts when controlling for selection. Profitable firms 
are particularly likely to be turned down for loans, once selection is controlled for. This may 
simply be because of the reasons they are seeking finance. Firms who have experienced financial 
problems such as missed payments in the past also find it harder to access finance, but we find 
no evidence of discrimination about female owned firmed (if anything, the reverse) which may 
suggest they apply for smaller sums. Similarly, firms seeking finance who have business plans are 
more likely to be rejected. One reason is that they may be making more ambitious requests or 
seeking debt finance where equity finance may be more appropriate.9 
 
5. Lagging regions  
The above analysis has used an indicator of peripherality. Using such a measure has an advantage 
that it is plausibly exogenous with financing, in the short term at least. Yet more historical 
specific, longer-term processes may be operating which shape patterns of uneven development 
(Hall, 2013). Transport accessibility will be partly determined by economic development with, for 
example, affluent areas having more connections and so being seen as less “peripheral” relative 
to elsewhere. An example is Aberdeen which has, until recently, had a highly successful oil & gas 
industry and been well connected, despite its relative geographic isolation. Uneven geography 
                                                             
9 We are grateful to a referee for this interpretation. 
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may become partly self-reinforcing, as bank finance is less likely to reach regions with weak 
economies. 
To test whether our results apply for lagging regions as well as peripheral ones, we apply a 
measure based on eligibility for European regional development funding. Firms are aggregated 
into two groups to match EU regional policy: (1) Less developed regions – these are regions with 
less than 75% of the EU average GDP.10 (2) Transition regions – these are those with GDP 
between 75 and 90 percent of the EU average GDP. For clarity of interpretation and to avoid 
small sample sizes both sets of regions are included in a single variable. These are defined 
according to NUTS regions, however, and these do not perfectly overlap with postcode areas. All 
postcode areas which overlap with the relevant NUTS areas are used. 
The results for ‘lagging regions’ are broadly similar to those for peripheral regions. Table 5 shows 
the results for demand, discouragement and supply of bank finance. All regressions include full 
controls as in tables 3 and 4. Innovative firms, as before, seem to have higher demand for 
external finance but also find it harder to access. They are more likely to apply for bank finance, 
yet no more or less likely to be discouraged. They are more likely to be rejected regardless of 
whether we correct for selection. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has considered the demand and supply of bank finance for innovative firms and how 
this varies in peripheral versus core regions. Using detailed firm-level data, it has focused on the 
demand and supply of bank loans and overdrafts. Our first question related to the demand for 
bank finance. We find that innovative firms in general are more likely to be discouraged from 
applying for bank finance, but that innovative firms in peripheral regions are particularly so. It 
may be that innovative firms in peripheral areas feel they are unlikely to pass the hard 
information tests required when making applications. Yet demand is actually higher for 
innovative firms in peripheral regions – as shown by higher probabilities of loan or overdraft 
applications. One potential explanation for this is the pecking order hypothesis. Peripheral 
innovators may be forced to seek bank loans or overdraft funding as they lack internal capital 
                                                             
10 The regions in category 1 are: Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly (postcode areas: TR, PL), West Wales and 
the Valleys (LL, SY, SA, LD) (note we exclude Cardiff and Newport from this definition). The UK regions 
in category 2 are: Cumbria (CA, LA), Devon (EX, TQ, TA), East Yorkshire and North Lincolnshire (YO, 
HU), Highlands and Islands (KW, IV, PH, PA, ZE), Lancashire (LA, PR, BB, BD, FY – note exclude 
Manchester, Oldham, Wigan and Blackburn), Lincolnshire (LN, DN), Merseyside (L, CH, WA), Northern 
Ireland (BT), Shropshire and Staffordshire (ST, TR), South Yorkshire (YO, S), Tees Valley and Durham 
(DH, TS, DL). 
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(e.g. because property values are lower in peripheral areas, so firms have less collateral) or 
because access to specialised bank finance in peripheral areas with thin markets for 
entrepreneurial finance is more limited. This demonstrates the interplay between different 
sources of finance within thin markets. 
Our second finding relates to supply: innovative firms in peripheral regions are more likely to 
have their applications for bank finance rejected, even when controlling for selection effects and 
a wide set of firm-level variables such as credit score. This suggests that the idea that geography 
does not matter for firm financing is mistaken. On the contrary, innovative SMEs located in 
remote regions seem to suffer a “liability of distance” in terms of accessing funding, providing 
further evidence for claims that lending practices by banks and other funders “can be spatially 
discriminatory” (Martin and Sunley, 2015, pp. 32). In so doing, it reflects the wider literature on 
spatial bias in equity markets (Wójcik, 2011) Meanwhile, it also supports other research in this 
area (Alessandrini et al., 2009c; Degryse et al, 2015; Donati and Sarno, 2015), while extending this 
work to innovative firms.  
Overall, our results support the argument that patterns of bank lending are intertwined with both 
the geography and institutional structures of financial systems (Clark and Wójcik, 2007; Wójcik, 
2011). The tighter financing constraints facing innovative firms experience in some regions often 
dovetail with a strong presence of large non-local bank branches. It also seems to confirm the 
presence of a “flight to headquarters” effect in UK banks intent on rebalancing their loan 
portfolios across different local markets since the GFC (Degryse et al, 2015). The increasingly 
pervasive use of lending technologies and reduced local autonomy in loan decisions have resulted 
in the largest increase in spatial concentration in the UK for at least four decades (Wójcik & 
MacDonald Korth, 2015). In other words, organisational and technological changes are reducing 
the relational proximity between banks and SMEs. These problems seem to be particularly acute 
for innovative firms, who are more informationally opaque that traditional SMEs, further 
exacerbating their “liability of distance”. Therefore, this lack of local decision making autonomy 
in loan decisions may be hindering the innovation process in some disadvantaged UK regions. 
Our results may partially be explained by a lack of alternative financing options for innovative 
firms in peripheral areas, as thin-markets for equity finance or a lack of internal capital mean they 
are forced to make poor quality applications to banks instead. A lack of local banking institutions 
and limited autonomy within branches of distantly headquartered banks seem to be key features 
of these thin markets. It therefore seems logical to extend the nature of how banks are structured 
as a key aspect underpinning thin financial markets and indeed to incorporate financial issues into 
the wider concept of organizationally “thin regions” (Isaksen, 2015). Overcoming the existence 
of thin markets is not just a question of supply of funding but rather about building a vibrant 
funding ecosystem of many “complex component parts” (Nightingale et al, 2009, 28) which 
 21 
covers a range of different types of finance for innovative SMEs. Regions with a richer and more 
varied “financial ecology” (Degryse et al, 2015), including locally headquartered financial 
institutions and a more diverse array of alternative funding sources, may be less prone to 
restrictions in accessing credit. More empirical work is needed to examine the entire range of 
funding institutions constituting thin markets, especially as SMEs in peripheral regions seem to 
face similar difficulties whether it is accessing debt, equity and alternative sources of finance.  
These “liability of distance” effects align with other research on this topic and raise important 
policy questions. This seems especially prescient for countries with highly centralised and 
monopolistic banking systems where a lack of credit for SMEs is one of the reasons it is 
“problematic to do business in the UK” (NAO, 2013, 15). Overall, the research suggests that 
policy makers are right to consider the concept of regionalised networks of banks but that such 
institutions need to prioritise innovative SMEs, who seem particularly disadvantaged in certain 
regions. However, the design and construction of these banks needs to be very carefully 
considered so that they genuinely augment existing lending provision, by increasing competition, 
rather than crowding it out as some government-funded VC programmes have done (Cumming 
& MacIntosh, 2006). Other additional interventions might include promoting the growing range 
of alternative forms of small business funding such as crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending 
within SMEs. Initiatives designed to improve the financial acumen of SMEs is another approach 
to help increase access to finance (Seghers et al, 2012). Building endogenous financial capacity in 
regions should be a central task underpinning these policy frameworks in thin peripheral financial 
markets.  
Of course, there are potential methodological explanations for these results. The first is some 
sort of omitted variable bias and more information on balance sheets may be needed to address 
this problem. Alternatively, further consideration of the type of finance requested may further 
address this concern. The second is some sort of selection issue, with firms in peripheral areas 
introducing new products which are simply less commercially viable than in other areas. 
Regardless, it is a potentially troubling finding. There are a number of limitations to the paper as 
stands which open up avenues for further empirical research. It is hard to find appropriate 
measures of innovation and while those used here are inclusive, they are inevitably limited and 
may disguise sectoral variation and hide the significance or quality of any innovation. Future 
work may want to address these issues. Finally, other factors such as regulation, legal frameworks 
and banking culture will also impact on the geographical disparities identified here. Future work 
comparing multiple countries could help address this concern. In particular, it might be that the 
organisation of banks, and their decision making in particular, will influence the access to finance 
decision, particularly where there are relatively centralised financial systems such as the UK. 
Future work may wish to replicate these results in more decentralised countries. 
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Tables & Figures 
Figure 1. Peripheral postcode areas 
 
Note: Also includes Northern Ireland & Shetland 
 30 
 
Table 1. Variable descriptions and summary stats 
Variable  Details Obs Mean 
Loan application Firm has made new application for term loan in previous 12 months 39994 0.05 
Overdraft application Firm has made new application for overdraft in previous 12 months 39994 0.06 
Loan rejection Firm applied for loan but was rejected 39994 0.02 
Overdraft application Firm applied for overdraft but was rejected 39994 0.03 
Discouraged Discouraged 35970 
994 
0.03 
Periphery Firm located in peripheral postcode area 3 994 0.09 
Innovator Firm has introduced a new product or service in past 36 months 39994 0.23 
Profit Firm made profit in last financial year 39994 0.68 
Loss Firm made loss in last financial year 39994 0.13 
Aims to grow Firm aims to grow 39994 0.52 
Financial problem Firm has experienced financial issues in past 3 years 39994 0.18 
Women owned Firm owned by a woman 39994 0.33 
IV Credit risk 2 Instrumented credit score 39994 0.18 
IV Credit risk 3 Instrumented credit score 39994 0.31 
IV Credit risk 4 Instrumented credit score 39994 0.38 
1 – 9 Emps Employment size, 1 – 9  39994 0.86 
10 – 49 Emps Employment size, 10 - 49 39994 0.12 
50 – 99 Emps Employment size, 50 - 99  39994 0.01 
100 – 199 Emps Employment size, 100 – 199 39994 0.01 
200 – 249 Emps  Employment size, 200 – 249 39994 0.01 
0 – 5 years Firm age, 2 – 5 years 39994 0.24 
6 – 15 years Firm age, 6 – 9 years 39994 0.29 
15 + years Firm age, 15 years +  39994 0.45 
Sole Prop Legal structure: Sole Prop 39994 0.26 
Partnership Legal structure: Partnership 39994 0.14 
LLP Legal structure: LLP 39994 0.03 
LLC Legal structure: LLC 39994 0.57 
Exports Firm exports 39994 0.12 
Business plan Firm has business plan 39994 0.43 
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Table 2. Cross-tabulations: Applications by geography, firm type 
 
% of firms: Peripheral  Non-peripheral  
 Product 
innovator 
Not 
product 
innovator 
Product 
innovator 
Not 
product 
innovator 
Applying for loans 7.7 
(0.000) 
5.4 
(0.015) 
6.6 
(0.000) 
4.0 
Applying for overdraft 9.4 
(0.000) 
6.2 
(0.244) 
7.7 
(0.000) 
5.4 
     
Notes: sample size 50,175. P-values in parentheses from simple probit regressions (with weights) 
with the reference category of column 4 – the ‘normal’ firm. 
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Table 3. Regression: Demand for finance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Discouraged  New loan application New overdraft application 
Periphery -0.0821 -0.0414   0.130** 0.118**   0.0725 0.0824   
 (0.0675) (0.0704)   (0.0513) (0.0523)   (0.0500) (0.0510)   
Innovator 0.160*** 0.170***   0.240*** 0.162***   0.178*** 0.117***   
 (0.0453) (0.0509)   (0.0367) (0.0392)   (0.0364) (0.0407)   
Non-periph / Innov   0.136*** 0.147***   0.245*** 0.169***   0.175*** 0.114*** 
   (0.0475) (0.0532)   (0.0388) (0.0411)   (0.0384) (0.0427) 
Periph / Non-innov   -0.172** -0.131   0.145** 0.138**   0.0637 0.0756 
   (0.0808) (0.0826)   (0.0601) (0.0610)   (0.0576) (0.0582) 
Periph / Innov   0.286** 0.328**   0.326*** 0.223**   0.276*** 0.219** 
   (0.122) (0.131)   (0.0920) (0.0944)   (0.0977) (0.101) 
Profit  -0.0604  -0.0595  0.0908  0.0905  0.128**  0.128** 
  (0.0708)  (0.0708)  (0.0561)  (0.0561)  (0.0551)  (0.0552) 
Loss  0.298***  0.297***  0.226***  0.226***  0.189***  0.189*** 
  (0.0810)  (0.0811)  (0.0752)  (0.0752)  (0.0636)  (0.0636) 
Aims to grow  0.0321  0.0311  0.204***  0.204***  0.107***  0.107*** 
  (0.0508)  (0.0508)  (0.0403)  (0.0403)  (0.0384)  (0.0384) 
Financial problems  0.376***  0.376***  0.510***  0.510***  0.534***  0.534*** 
  (0.0888)  (0.0888)  (0.0702)  (0.0702)  (0.0650)  (0.0650) 
Women owned  0.0161  0.0170  -0.0468  -0.0468  0.0377  0.0378 
  (0.0501)  (0.0501)  (0.0387)  (0.0387)  (0.0376)  (0.0376) 
Exports  -0.0753  -0.0752  -0.0296  -0.0298  0.0649  0.0649 
  (0.0798)  (0.0798)  (0.0612)  (0.0612)  (0.0621)  (0.0621) 
Business plan  0.0682  0.0669  0.181***  0.181***  0.122***  0.122*** 
  (0.0463)  (0.0463)  (0.0363)  (0.0363)  (0.0350)  (0.0350) 
IV Credit risk 2  1.345  1.351  -0.102  -0.104  1.319  1.319 
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  (1.992)  (1.992)  (1.238)  (1.239)  (1.247)  (1.246) 
IV Credit risk 3  1.442**  1.439**  -1.419***  -1.419***  0.303  0.303 
  (0.690)  (0.690)  (0.452)  (0.452)  (0.459)  (0.459) 
IV Credit risk 4  2.059  2.063  -1.068  -1.068  1.057  1.056 
  (1.667)  (1.667)  (1.165)  (1.165)  (1.121)  (1.121) 
10 – 49 employees  0.108  0.109  -0.180  -0.180  -0.0250  -0.0251 
  (0.150)  (0.150)  (0.114)  (0.114)  (0.109)  (0.109) 
50 – 99 employees  0.0869  0.0889  -0.271**  -0.271**  -0.157  -0.157 
  (0.183)  (0.183)  (0.136)  (0.136)  (0.131)  (0.131) 
100 – 199 Emps  -0.305  -0.306  -0.184  -0.184  -0.0125  -0.0130 
  (0.224)  (0.224)  (0.154)  (0.154)  (0.151)  (0.150) 
200 – 249 Emps   -0.261  -0.272  -0.138  -0.137  -0.171  -0.171 
  (0.285)  (0.281)  (0.150)  (0.150)  (0.161)  (0.161) 
6 – 15 years  -0.0122  -0.0126  0.00401  0.00413  -0.0267  -0.0267 
  (0.0455)  (0.0455)  (0.0391)  (0.0391)  (0.0358)  (0.0358) 
15 years +  0.0903  0.0911  -0.158**  -0.158**  0.0632  0.0633 
  (0.0970)  (0.0969)  (0.0702)  (0.0702)  (0.0676)  (0.0676) 
Constant -1.825*** -3.526*** -1.818*** -3.518*** -1.543*** -0.789 -1.545*** -0.791 -1.414*** -2.495*** -1.413*** -2.494*** 
 (0.0586) (1.363) (0.0585) (1.363) (0.0477) (0.923) (0.0478) (0.923) (0.0442) (0.907) (0.0443) (0.906) 
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector & legal status controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
             
Observations 35,970 35,970 35,970 35,970 39,994 39,994 39,994 39,994 39,994 39,994 39,994 39,994 
Pseudo R2 0.00723 0.0849 0.00806 0.0856 0.0126 0.0513 0.0126 0.0514 0.0117 0.0644 0.0117 0.0644 
Notes: Estimated as probit regression. Unreported Controls: legal structure, sector and survey wave. Weights applied. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4. Supply of finance  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Rejection: 
Loan 
 Rejection: 
Overdraft 
 Rejection: 
Loan 
 Rejection: 
Overdraft 
 
Estimation method Probit Probit Probit Probit Heckman 
probit  
Heckman 
probit 
Heckman 
probit 
Heckman 
probit 
Periphery -0.0118  0.0517  0.0433  0.0956  
 (0.0702)  (0.0585)  (0.0509)  (0.0629)  
Innovator 0.199***  0.184***  0.169***  0.170***  
 (0.0492)  (0.0485)  (0.0341)  (0.0435)  
Non-periph / Innov  0.191***  0.194***  0.150***  0.172*** 
  (0.0512)  (0.0508)  (0.0358)  (0.0456) 
Periph / Non-innov  -0.0421  0.0851  -0.0296  0.102 
  (0.0881)  (0.0668)  (0.0638)  (0.0729) 
Periph / Innov  0.252**  0.137  0.332***  0.259** 
  (0.113)  (0.114)  (0.0829)  (0.110) 
Profit 0.0683 0.0687 0.0642 0.0633 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.104 0.104 
 (0.0671) (0.0671) (0.0669) (0.0668) (0.0456) (0.0455) (0.0692) (0.0688) 
Loss 0.266*** 0.265*** 0.175** 0.175** 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.116 0.117 
 (0.0848) (0.0848) (0.0747) (0.0747) (0.0566) (0.0565) (0.0897) (0.0886) 
Aims to grow 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.0819* 0.0825* 0.175*** 0.176*** 0.0180 0.0196 
 (0.0515) (0.0515) (0.0452) (0.0452) (0.0332) (0.0331) (0.0534) (0.0528) 
Financial problems 0.485*** 0.484*** 0.532*** 0.532*** 0.396*** 0.397*** 0.378*** 0.380*** 
 (0.0824) (0.0824) (0.0759) (0.0759) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0959) (0.0944) 
Women owned -0.116** -0.116** -0.0214 -0.0217 -0.0682* -0.0697** -0.0335 -0.0333 
 (0.0500) (0.0500) (0.0456) (0.0456) (0.0355) (0.0355) (0.0451) (0.0447) 
Exports -0.0130 -0.0124 0.0397 0.0393 -0.0201 -0.0201 0.120 0.118 
 (0.0811) (0.0811) (0.0737) (0.0738) (0.0456) (0.0455) (0.0741) (0.0735) 
Business plan 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.0468 0.0470 0.131*** 0.130***   
 (0.0442) (0.0442) (0.0409) (0.0409) (0.0323) (0.0323)   
IV Credit risk 2 -0.584 -0.583 -0.0380 -0.0521 -0.953 -0.889 1.474 1.439 
 (1.655) (1.655) (1.423) (1.424) (0.795) (0.796) (1.376) (1.366) 
IV Credit risk 3 -0.732 -0.732 0.106 0.104 -0.0436 -0.0378 1.000* 0.989* 
 (0.584) (0.584) (0.537) (0.537) (0.237) (0.237) (0.554) (0.550) 
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IV Credit risk 4 -0.837 -0.837 0.730 0.720 0.123 0.151 2.792** 2.755** 
 (1.473) (1.473) (1.308) (1.309) (0.388) (0.389) (1.412) (1.398) 
10 – 49 employees -0.162 -0.162 0.0141 0.0142 0.0106 0.00777 0.183 0.181 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.130) (0.130) (0.0485) (0.0485) (0.136) (0.135) 
50 – 99 employees -0.326* -0.326* -0.152 -0.152 -0.110 -0.109 0.0317 0.0292 
 (0.167) (0.167) (0.157) (0.157) (0.0730) (0.0730) (0.168) (0.167) 
100 – 199 Emps -0.379* -0.380* -0.0681 -0.0661 -0.0971 -0.0980 0.0401 0.0396 
 (0.195) (0.195) (0.180) (0.180) (0.0943) (0.0943) (0.198) (0.197) 
200 – 249 Emps  -0.143 -0.145 -0.427* -0.429* 0.0535 0.0458 -0.117 -0.115 
 (0.189) (0.188) (0.221) (0.221) (0.127) (0.127) (0.247) (0.246) 
6 – 15 years -0.0313 -0.0315 -0.00945 -0.00954   0.00535 0.00460 
 (0.0462) (0.0462) (0.0424) (0.0424)   (0.0466) (0.0461) 
15 years + -0.0416 -0.0414 0.0692 0.0686   0.156* 0.155* 
 (0.0885) (0.0885) (0.0813) (0.0813)   (0.0818) (0.0812) 
Partnership -0.0203 -0.0192 0.0746 0.0725     
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.0996) (0.0996)     
LLP 0.0848 0.0862 0.127 0.124     
 (0.177) (0.177) (0.164) (0.164)     
LLC -0.0157 -0.0150 0.176 0.175     
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.112) (0.112)     
Constant -1.550 -1.547 -2.470** -2.465** -2.189*** -2.203*** -3.881*** -3.861*** 
 (1.183) (1.182) (1.051) (1.052) (0.310) (0.311) (1.053) (1.046) 
         
Wave & Sector 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 39,994 39,994 39,994 39,994 39,994 39,994 39,994 39,994 
Pseudo R2 0.0595 0.0596 0.0698 0.0700     
Wald Test     426.31 432.17 457.30 460.58 
P-value     0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LR Test     4.46 3.82 5.46 5.56 
p-value     0.0347 0.0508 0.0195 0.0184 
Notes: Estimated as probit regression (columns 1 – 4) with Heckman correction (columns 5 – 8). First 
stage regressions for 5 – 8 not reported. Weights applied. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical 
significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 5. Demand and supply of finance: Lagging regions  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) 
Application for  Demand   Rejection  Loans Overdraft 
 Loan Overdraft Discouragement Loans Overdraft Rejection 
rate 
Rejection 
rate 
        
Non-lagging / Innovator 0.147*** 0.131*** 0.0996* 0.146*** 0.189*** 0.201*** 0.199*** 
 (0.0417) (0.0403) (0.0536) (0.0531) (0.0481) (0.0365) (0.0243) 
Lagging / Non-innov -0.0228 0.0223 -0.180 0.0507 0.0769 0.0752* 0.141*** 
 (0.0568) (0.0531) (0.249) (0.0690) (0.0651) (0.0442) (0.0466) 
Lagging / Innovator 0.185*** 0.154*** 0.0945 0.164** 0.170*** 0.264*** 0.282*** 
 (0.0540) (0.0512) (0.244) (0.0658) (0.0590) (0.0416) (0.0417) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Estimation method  Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Heckman 
probit 
Heckman 
probit 
Obs 40,115 40,115 36,086 40,115 40,115 39,994 39,994 
Pseudo R2 0.0519 0.0657 0.0881 0.0581 0.0717   
Wald Test      438.74 673.51 
P-value      0.0000 0.0000 
LR Test      5.92 11.31 
p-value      0.0150 0.0008 
 39 
Notes: Estimated as probit regression. Regressions 6 – 9 use Heckman correction. Controls: Size, age, sector, growth ambitions, exports, business plan, profits, 
loss, financial problems, risk rating, survey wave and legal structure (used as selection variables for regressions 6 & 8). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Statistical significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
